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NOTES
FOSTER PARENT LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 1983: FOSTER
PARENTS' LIABILITY AS STATE AcTORs FOR ABUSE
To FOSTER CHILDREN
The goal and purpose of foster care in the United States is to "provide
a temporary, safe haven for children whose parents are unable to care for
them."' Unfortunately, statistics show that foster children suffer abuse
ten times more often than children in the general population.2
One example is the case of K.H.,3 a child born in Chicago in 1981. 4
Foster care left K.H. abused and emotionally disturbed by her sixth
birthday.5 Her foster parents beat and neglected her, while a neighbor of
one foster parent sexually abused her.6 The Illinois Department of Chil-
dren and Family Services failed to stop the abuse after discovering it.7
In KH. Through Murphy v. Morgan,' K.H. sued the Department, its
director, and the two social workers involved, alleging gross negligence
in failing to protect her.9 The Seventh Circuit upheld the lower court's
1. CHILD WELFARE LEAGUE OF AMERICA, STANDARDS FOR FOSTER FAMILY SERvIcES 8
(1975).
2. Michael B. Mushlin, Unsafe Havens: The Case For Constitutional Protection Of Foster Chil-
dren From Abuse And Neglect, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 199, 206 & n.30 (1988).
3. K.H. Through Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990). See infra notes 4-8 and
accompanying text.
4. 914 F.2d at 848.
5. Id.
6. Id. The juvenile court of Cook County originally removed K.H. from her parents' custody
when she was 17 months old and placed her in the custody of the Illinois Department of Children
and Family Services after the discovery that she had gonorrhea from vaginal intercourse. After six
transfers in the first 18 months of foster care, the Department placed K.H. with a foster parent who
beat and neglected her. In addition, the neighbor of this foster parent sexually abused K.H. The
Department subsequently transferred K.H. to another foster parent who also physically abused her.
The Department finally transferred K.H. to an institution that provided safe and professional care.
Id.
7. Id. The evidence showed that the Department knew that previous foster parents had sexu-
ally abused K.H. and that she required psychotherapy after her seventh foster placement. The De-
partment, however, still placed her with foster parents incapable of caring for the child. In addition,
the court noted that K.H.'s nine placements over four years revealed the level of disarray in the
state's system of caring for abused and neglected children. Moreover, such shuttling could amount
to a breach of the state's constitutional obligation to the children. Id.
8. 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990).
9. K.H. brought the action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
i201
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rejection of the defendant's qualified immunity defense."0 However,
while K.H. may recover from the defendant state employees in their indi-
vidual capacity, the Seventh Circuit stated, in dicta, that foster parents
are not "state actors" and therefore could not be liable under federal
law.1
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
10. 914 F.2d at 852. The Seventh Circuit assumed that the allegations in the complaint were
true for the purposes of adjudicating the motion to dismiss. Id. at 847. The defendants moved to
dismiss the complaint arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity. Id. See Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (government officials can be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988)
only if the constitutional right they violated was clearly established at the time of the alleged viola-
tion). The defendants claimed that a foster child's right not to be placed with parents known to be
incompetent was not clearly established between 1982 and 1986, the period during which K.H. was
in foster care. K.H. Through Murphy v. Morgan, No. 87C 9833, 1989 WL 105279, at *13 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 6, 1989), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990). In rejecting this
argument, the district court held that Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), clearly established
this right in 1982 and any dissimilarities between the two cases were unimportant. Id. at * 14. For a
discussion of the qualified immunity defense, see generally John B. Kassel, Note, Defining the Scope
of the Due Process Right To Protection: The Fourth Circuit Considers Child Abuse and Good Faith
Immunity, 70 CORNELL L. Rav. 940 (1985).
11. 914 F.2d at 852. Various states' laws hold foster parents liable for negligent or intentional
torts inflicted on foster children. See DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV, THE VULNERABLE SOCIAL WORKER
111-16 & n.23 (1985) (citing, eg., Zalak v. Carroll, 205 N.W.2d 313 (N.Y. 1965) (relatives who care
for a child are liable under state tort law for negligence to the child)).
An argument could be made that foster parents should be afforded the same immunity from suits
by their children as natural parents. The policy reasons behind natural-parent immunity, preserva-
tion of the family unit, domestic tranquility, protection of family resources and reluctance to inter-
fere with family decisions, apply equally to foster parents. Some courts hold that foster parents
stand in loco parentis to the foster child and thus have the same rights, responsibilities, duties, and
liabilities of natural parents. See Brown v. Phillips, 342 S.E.2d 786 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (because
foster parents stand in loco parentis toward foster children they are immune from liability for alleged
negligence that resulted in injury to foster child); Berry v. Schorling, 440 N.E.2d 1216 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1982) (parental immunity doctrine applies to persons standing in loco parentis).
However, a majority of jurisdictions have started a trend of abolishing parental immunity. In
addition, parental immunity only applies in cases of ordinary negligence. Even in those jurisdictions
that still recognize parental immunity, the immunity does not apply when abuse results from grossly
negligent or intentional conduct. Finally, many of those jurisdictions that still recognize parental
immunity do not extend it to foster parents. In Mayberry v. Pryor, 374 N.W. 2d 683 (Mich. 1985),
the court held that foster parents could not invoke parental immunity. The court reasoned that the
policies for affording natural-parent immunity do not apply to foster parents.
However, while states may not afford foster parental immunity, states may provide foster parents
governmental immunity from tort actions. See Pickett v. Washington Co. 572 P.2d 1070, 1074 (Or.
Ct. App. 1977) (shelter care parents are generally immune from liability for acts and ommissions
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This Note argues that foster parents who abuse foster children are
state actors for constitutional purposes12 and are therefore liable under
title 42, section 1983 of the United States Code. 3 Finding "state actors"
and "state action" is significant in two ways. First, for constitutional
purposes, the actor is responsible for the protections embodied in the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution on the same terms as is any
state.'4 Secondly, "state action" fulfills section 1983's "acting under
color of state law" element. 5 Thus, if a state actor has deprived an indi-
vidual of rights, privileges, or immunities that the Constitution guaran-
relating to the supervision of a ward; foster parents perform a government function and are therefore
immune from tort liability).
For a list of citations of jurisdictions that recognize parental immunity and those that do not, see
59 AM. JUR. 2d Parent and Child § 139 nn.74-76 (1987). For an additional discussion of foster
parents' right to parental immunity, see Todd R. Smyth, Annotation, Foster Parent's Right To Im-
munity From Foster Child's Negligence Claims, 55 A.L.R.4th 778 (1987 & Supp. 1990).
12. A state actor "for constitutional purposes" refers to liability under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The Fourteenth Amendment affects only conduct considered state action, and provides no
enforcement power over purely private conduct. See infra notes 87-156 and accompanying text.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). See infra notes 87-156 and accompanying text. See supra note 9.
In some cases, this liability could extend to the municipality with jurisdiction over the placement of
the child. Under § 1983 municipalities face liability only when their policies or customs encourage
actions of private parties that deprive an individual's constitutional rights. Monell v. Dep't of Social
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). Further, when municipalities entrust decisionmaking authority
to private persons, the courts could then treat the decisions as the municipalities' own. Ancata v.
Prison Health Servs., Inc., 769 F.2d 700, 705 nn.9, 11 (1 1th Cir. 1985). At least five other circuits
employ this "rule of final authority." See Rookard v. Health & Hosps. Corp., 710 F.2d 41, 45 (2d
Cir. 1983); McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1116 (9th Cir. 1983); Black v. Stephens, 662
F.2d 181, 191 (3d Cir. 1981), cert denied, 458 U.S. 1008 (1982); Familias Unidas v. Briscoe, 619
F,2d 391, 404 (5th Cir. 1980). See generally, Eric Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation After Monell,
79 COLUM L. REv. 213 (1979); Douglas W. Durham, Note, Inmate's Rights and the Privatization of
Prisons, 86 COLUM L. REv. 1475 (1986).
14.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or prop-
erty, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
15. See supra note 9. The interplay between state action and acting "under color of state law"
is not altogether clear. See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966) ("under color of law"
is the same thing as state action); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 163 & n.26 (1970) (not
all conduct that qualifies as "under color of law" is state action). In Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,
457 U.S. 922 (1982), the Court held that a finding of state action under the Fourteenth Amendment
satisfies the "under color of law requirement" of § 1983. Id. at 929. However, the Court noted that
the converse is not necessarily true; while a state-law right can trigger § 1983, the Fourteenth
Amendment is implicated only where constitutional rights are at issue. Id. at 935 n.18. Thus,
although previous cases have treated the two requirements as identical, they are analytically distinct.
Id.
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tees,16 the aggrieved party can recover compensatory relief under section
1983.17
Part I of this Note examines the constitutional duties and protections
that states owe to foster children, analogizing to inmates in the prison
context and to the institutionalized mentally impaired.'" Part II dis-
cusses the Supreme Court's analysis of the state action doctrine and ar-
gues that finding foster parents liable as state actors is consistent with the
development of that doctrine. 19 The Note concludes that foster parents
are state actors and, thus, should be liable to their foster children under
section 1983 for any abuse or other constitutional deprivations.2"
I. FOSTER CHILDRENS' CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT To SAFETY
A. The Development of the Right to Safety for Incarcerated and
Institutionalized Persons
The Supreme Court recognized the constitutional right to safety for
incarcerated and institutionalized individuals in Estelle v. Gamble2 and
Youngberg v. Romeo.22 In Estelle, a prisoner brought a section 1983 ac-
tion, alleging that the state's grossly negligent failure to provide adequate
medical care violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment.2 3 In holding that the prisoner stated a claim
16. See supra notes 9 and 14.
17. For abused foster children, the injunctive relief available under the Fourteenth Amendment
comes too late and serves no purpose. Their only recourse is to recover damages under § 1983 for
the pain and psychological trauma of the experience. Therefore, this Note focuses on the foster
child's ability to recover money damages from an abusive parent under § 1983.
While in many cases the foster parent may not have a "deep pocket," the purpose of finding a
foster parent a state actor and thus liable under § 1983 goes beyond monetary damages. Finding
foster parents liable as state actors might reform the system and minimize the child abuse that does
occur. In some cases that might mean discouraging potentially good foster parents. However, find-
ing foster parents liable as state actors would create an incentive for state and private placement
agencies to be more careful in their placement of children because a child could possibly recover
from the state or home private placement agency for the foster parents' abuse.
18. See infra notes 21-91 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 82-145 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
21. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
22. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
23. 429 U.S. at 101. The Eighth Amendment reads: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
The inmate claimed the state failed to treat him adequately for a back injury. 429 U.S. at 99-101.
For two months the doctors offered no treatment other than pain relievers. Although the plaintiff
complained about the continuing pain and his subsequent high blood pressure, the doctors refused to
grant the plaintiff "sick call." The prison therefore ordered the plaintiff to work. When he refused
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss4/7
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upon which relief could be granted, the Court found that the government
has an obligation to provide medical care to those whom it incarcer-
ates.24 Because a prisoner relies on state officials to meet his medical
needs, the state's failure to provide the care results in a denial of a pris-
oner's fundamental need. Such a denial constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment.25
In Youngberg v. Romeo,26 the Supreme Court relied on the reasoning
in Estelle to find that state officials must guarantee reasonable safety and
freedom from unnecessary restraint to involuntarily committed mentally
retarded persons. 27 Nicholas Romeo, a mentally retarded man, brought
an action for damages against the Pennhurst State School and Hospital
and three administrators for injuries he suffered during his commitment
to the institution.2 The claim alleged that the hospital officials knew or
should have known of the injuries and that they failed to take the appro-
priate preventative measures29 in violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights."a In finding that the plaintiff stated a claim for relief
the prison disciplinary committee placed him in solitary confinement. Later, when the plaintiff
experienced chest pains and asked to see a doctor, the guards refused. Id.
24. "[D]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain'." 429 U.S. at 104 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173
(1976)).
25. Id. at 103. The Court has never awarded relief for failure generally to provide safe condi-
tions for prisoners. However, in subsequent cases the Court has referred to Estelle as establishing
the state's duty to provide a safe environment for prisoners. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 199-200 (1989) (Estelle and Youngberg, taken together, estab-
lish that a state assumes some responsibility for the safety of a person whom it took into its custody
against that person's will). See also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978). But see Rhodes v. Chap-
man, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) (approving of lower court decisions that granted relief for unsafe condi-
tions); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (same); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986)
(negligent failure to protect an incarcerated inmate does not violate due process clause); Davidson v.
Cannon, 474 U.S. 344 (1986) (same). See Mushlin, supra note 2, at 223 n.139.
Estelle did open the door for lower courts to find that the states are affirmatively obligated to
provide prisoners with a safe environment. See Walsh v. Mellas, 837 F.2d 789, 795-96 (7th Cir.)
(failure to devise system to screen prisoners' files for compatibility with cellmates constituted "delib-
erate indifference"), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1061 (1988); Watts v. Laurent, 774 F.2d 168, 172 (7th
Cir. 1985) ("failure of institutional [personnel] to protect a prisoner from the assaults of other pris-
oner' can ... rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation"), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1085
(1986); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980) (Eighth Amendment protects prison inmates
from environments where "degeneration" is possible), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981).
26. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
27. Id. at 319.
28. His own violence and the response of other inmates led to his injuries. Id.
29. The complaint alleged that Nicholas suffered injuries on 63 different occasions over a two-
year period. Id.
30. Id. The Third Circuit limited the Eighth Amendment to convicts only. Therefore, the
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under section 1983, the Court acknowledged that precedent established
the plaintiff's right to adequate food, shelter, clothing, and medical care.
Significantly, the Court held that the plaintiff and other institutionalized
individuals have Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests in safety and
freedom of movement.31 In contrast, courts in prison cases previously
relied exclusively on the Eighth Amendment to find a duty to provide a
safe environment.32  The Court in Youngberg refused to expand the
Eighth Amendment protections beyond the prison context.33 However,
by finding a liberty interest in safety in the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court expanded the right of safety beyond the prison context.34
B. The "Special Relationship' Doctrine
Soon after Youngberg, the Fourth Circuit held that the state may owe
a constitutional duty to prevent harm to an abused foster child When the
child abuse is reported to the state child protection officials. 35 The Sev-
enth Circuit followed suit, recognizing that the Constitution protects not
only those in state custody, but also those the state places in a position of
danger and then leaves defenseless. 36 Both courts relied on the state's
court dropped the Eighth Amendment claim. Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 156 (3d Cir.
1980), vacated and remanded, 457 U.S. 307 (1982). The Supreme Court thus never addressed the
Eighth Amendment issue. See 457 U.S. at 313.
31. 457 U.S. at 315-16. The Court first found that the right to personal security was an "his-
toric liberty interest" that the Due Process Clause protects. Id. at 315 (citing Ingraham v. Wright,
430 U.S. 651 (1977)). It further noted that penal confinement does not extinguish this right, con-
cluding that "[i]f it is cruel and unusual punishment to hold convicted criminals in unsafe condi-
tions, it must be unconstitutional to confine the involuntarily committed who may not be punished at
all in unsafe conditions." Id. at 315-16. While the court relied on the right to safety contained in
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, it characterized the right as
a liberty interest that the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of substantive due process protects.
Thus the Court bridged the gap between incarcerated and institutionalized persons. Id. This very
analysis forms the basis for extending the right to safety to other persons in state custody such as
foster children. See infra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
32. Historically, § 1983 claims that allege a specific constitutional right have fared better than
claims arising under the Fourteenth Amendment. Thus, the prisoner cases claiming a right to safety
relied exclusively on the Eighth Amendment, and rarely brought suit under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Garrett H. Smith, Note, DeShaney v. Winnebago County: The Narrowing Scope of Constitu-
tional Torts, 49 MD. L. REv. 484, 490 (1990).
33. See supra note 31.
34. See infra notes 46-47, and 53.
35. Jensen v. Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 194 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
This duty depends on whether the abuse occurred before or after the law establishing liability was
"clearly established." Id.
36. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (the Constitution does not require
states to protect individuals from criminals, but the Constitution does require a state to protect a
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-special relationship" to the plaintiffs to find an affirmative state duty to
protect.
C. Foster Children's Right to Safety Under the "Special
Relationship" Doctrine
The "special relationship" doctrine led some courts to find a right to
safety for foster children. In Doe v. New York City Department of Social
Services " the Second Circuit relied on Estelle to find that the child wel-
fare agency responsible for placing children in foster care had an affirma-
tive duty to protect those children.38 When the government takes
individuals into their custody, the custodial relationship creates "affirma-
tive duties" in the custodians; thus the agency had a duty to protect the
child from sexual assault while in foster care.39
In Taylor v. Ledbetter,' the Eleventh Circuit held that an involunta-
rily placed foster child's situation is so analogous to an inmate in a prison
or mental institution that the state assumes a constitutional duty to en-
sure the safety of the foster-home environment.4 1 In Taylor the plaintiff
person it puts in danger). See also White v. Rochford, 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979). In White,
police stopped a man in a car with three small children as passengers. The police arrested the man,
leaving the children alone in the car on the side of a limited access highway in cold weather. The
court held that this endangerment of innocent people patently intruded on their personal integrity.
Id. at 385. A duty to protect arose upon the placement of the children in such a dangerous situation.
See generally Mushlin, supra note 2, at 226-27.
37. 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983). See also Amy Sinden,
Comment, In Search of Affirmative Duties Toward Children Under a Post DeShaney Constitution,
139 U. PA. L. REv. 227, 246-48 (1990); Mushlin, supra note 2, at 234-37.
In Doe, the complaint alleged that the defendant, Catholic Home Bureau (a private placement
agency), failed to supervise the placement of the plaintiff in foster care and to report the subsequent
abuse to the New York City Department of Social Services. The foster parents raped, beat, and
removed the plaintiff from school. 649 F.2d at 137. The district court judge instructed the jury that
they could find the defendant liable only if the defendant actually intended to harm the plaintiff. The
jury found for the defendant and the plaintiff appealed.
38. 649 F.2d at 141. However, the plaintiff must prove that the state acted with "deliberate
indifference," rather than just simple negligence. Id. at 143 & n.3.
39. Id. at 141. The Second Circuit relied on Estelle and subsequent "special relationship" cases
(see infra note 41 and accompanying text) for the proposition that government officials may be liable
under § 1983 for failing to act when the state takes custody of individuals and then fails to fulfill its
custodial obligations.
The court found that the plaintiff foster child stated a claim against the defendant for failure
affirmatively to act to protect her safety. The court held that the defendant was liable if it was
deliberately indifferent to the abuse, and that the trial court erred in its "actually intended" instruc-
tion to the jury. Id. at 140-45.
40. 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 189 U.S. 1065 (1989).
41. Id. at 795.
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alleged that the state officials responsible for the child's placement failed
to protect the plaintiff. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that the officials
failed to investigate the fitness of the foster home, that they knew or
should have known that the foster parents were unfit to be trusted with
care, custody, and supervision of the child, and that they failed to super-
vise and inspect the foster home.42
The court analogized to Youngberg in finding that the plaintiff stated a
claim, saying that in both instances the state placed the person in an
involuntary custodial setting where the person was unable to seek alter-
native living arrangements.43 The court further noted that physical
safety is the primary objective in placement in either an institution or a
foster home.' Since a child confined to a state mental health facility has
a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in reasonably safe living condi-
tions, the state assumes a similar responsibility of keeping a child in fos-
ter care in a safe environment as well.45
D. The Seventh Circuit's Curtailment of the "Special Relationship"
Doctrine
The Supreme Court has not ruled on whether a state has a constitu-
tional duty to protect foster children from abuse.46 However, the Court
recognized the possibility of this duty in DeShaney v. Winnebago County
Department of Social Services. 4 7 In DeShaney, the Court held that a
child under the supervision of the state's child protection system, but in
the custody of his father, had no cause of action for the state's failure to
42. Id. at 792-93. The plaintiff was an involuntarily placed foster child whose foster mother
"willfully struck, sh[ook], th[rew] down, [beat] and otherwise severely abused. . ." her. Id. at 792.
As a result, the plaintiff suffered severe and permanent injuries and remains, as of this writing, in a
coma. Id. at 792-93. The plaintiff, through her guardian, brought suit under § 1983 against the
state and county officials responsible for her placement. Id. at 792.
43. Id. at 795.
44. Id.
45. Id. While the foster child has a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in safety, every
failure to provide safe foster care does not necessarily amount to a constitutional violation. Instead,
courts must balance the liberty interest against any legitimate governmental reasons the state prof-
fers for failing to take action. Only when the liberty interests outweigh the state's interest does the
deprivation of the protected interest constitute a Fourteenth Amendment violation. Id. For an
analysis of Taylor, see Douglas D. Selph, Comment, Taylor v. Ledbetter: Vindicating the Constitu-
tional Rights of Foster Children to Adequate Care and Protection, 22 GA. L. REV. 1187 (1988).
46. Lower courts are split on whether a constitutional duty to protect foster children exists. See
supra notes 38-45 and infra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
47. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
[Vol. 69:1201
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protect him from abuse.48 The court based its holding on the state's non-
custodial relationship with the child.49 Because the Constitution is a doc-
ument of negative liberties, 50 meant to protect individuals from state
action, it places no affirmative duty on the state to protect individuals
from third-party abuse.5" However, the Court specifically left open the
question of whether such a duty arises when a child is placed in foster
48. Id. at 197. In DeShaney, a court granted Randy DeShaney a divorce and custody of his
year-old son, Joshua. Upon his second divorce, Randy's second wife reported to the police that he
abused Joshua. In 1983, Joshua entered a hospital with multiple bruises and abrasions. The physi-
cian suspected abuse and reported the situation to the Winnebago County Department of Social
Services. The hospital subsequently obtained temporary custody of Joshua pursuant to a court or-
der, but within three days a county team returned Joshua to his father. A month later, Joshua again
entered the hospital with suspicious injuries, and the hospital again notified the Department. The
assigned caseworker concluded that no basis for action existed. During periodic visits to the
DeShaney house, the caseworker observed further injuries and recorded her conclusion that someone
was physically abusing Joshua. Finally, the Department removed the child from his father's custody
in 1984, but only after his father had beaten Joshua so severely that he fell into a coma; he is
expected to spend the rest of his life in an institution for the mentally retarded. Joshua and his
mother brought a substantive due process claim under § 1983 against the Department and various
employees for failing to protect him from his father's abuse. Id. at 191-93.
49. Id. at 197-201. Previous cases established that, in certain situations, individuals had a "spe-
cial relationship" with the state such that the state had an affirmative duty to protect the individual's
safety or other rights. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-25 (1982) (due process clause re-
quires the state to provide state-institutionalized mental patients with adequate measures to ensure
their safety as well as other services including food, shelter, clothing, and medical care); Martinez v.
California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980) (dicta) (state may be liable for depriving an individual of sub-
stantive due process life interest if the state releases a prisoner on parole who then murders the
individual); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976) (prisoners have an Eighth Amendment
right to adequate medical care). Martinez led to a string of lower court cases finding that once a
state perceives a danger to an individual from a third party, the state has an affirmative duty to
protect the potential victim. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 197-98 n.4; Balistreri v. Pacifica Police
Dep't, 855 F.2d 1421, 1425-26 (9th Cir. 1988); Wood v. Ostrander, 851 F.2d 1212, 1218-19 (9th Cir.
1988); Estate of Bailey by Oare v. County of York, 768 F.2d 503, 510-11 (3d Cir. 1985); Jensen v.
Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 190-94 & n.ll (4th Cir. 1984) (dicta), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985). See
also Fox v. Custis, 712 F.2d 84, 88 (4th Cir. 1983) (Fourteenth Amendment protection from danger-
ous parolee may exist if special custodial or other relationship exists between the state and the
citizen).
50. 489 U.S. at 194-97. The court of appeals earlier found for the defendant, relying, in part, on
language from Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982): "The Constitution is a charter
of negative liberties; it tells the state to let people alone; it does not require the federal government or
the state to provide services, even so elementary a service as maintaining law and order." DeShaney
v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 489 U.S. 189
(1989). See also David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI. L. REV.
864 (1986).
51. 489 U.S. at 198-203. The Court drew the line on "special relationship" at custody. Here
the state did not have custody of Joshua. Therefore, the state did not have a "special relationship"
and, accordingly, had no affirmative duty to protect him. Id.
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care.
52
The DeShaney Court virtually eliminated the "special relationship"
doctrine that the Doe and Taylor courts used to find an affirmative duty
to protect foster children." The Court held that nothing short of cus-
tody establishes constitutional liability under the Due Process Clause for
a state's failure to protect a child from private abuse. A state's custodial
relationship constitutes a "special relationship" and, accordingly, gives
rise to due process rights. Absent the custodial relationship, the plaintiff
did not acquire due process rights.5 4 The question remaining after
DeShaney is whether state custody of foster children is sufficiently analo-
gous to incarceration or institutionalization to give rise to a constitu-
tional duty to protect a foster child from abuse.
E. Foster Childrens' Right to Safety After DeShaney
In at least two circuits it appears that a foster child's right to safety has
survived DeShaney. In K.H. Through Murphy v. Morgan, S the Seventh
Circuit, relying on Youngberg, held that the state owes to people over
whom it assumes custody a "rudimentary duty of safekeeping."5 6 The
court found that K.H. had an affirmative right that should have pre-
52.
Had the state by the affirmative exercise of its power removed [the child] from free society
and placed him in a foster home operated by its agents, we might have a situation suli-
ciently analogous to incarceration or institutionalization to give rise to an affirmative duty
to protect.... We express no view on the validity of this analogy, as it is not before us in
the present case.
Id. at 201 n.9. See Laura Oren, Deshaney's Unfinished Business: The Foster Child's Due Process
Right to Safety, 69 N.C.L. REv. 113 (1990) (responding directly to DeShaney footnote 9, arguing
that foster children have a right to safety and the state has a corresponding affirmative duty to
protect them).
53. While the Seventh Circuit helped create the special relationship doctrine, it also helped
dismantle it. In Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1223 (7th Cir. 1988) (en bane), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1065 (1989), the court lamented the expansion of the special relationship doctrine,
suggesting that it had taken on "a life of it's own." Other circuits refused to apply the special
relationship doctrine under all but the narrowest circumstances. See Wideman v. Shallowford
Comm. Hosp., 826 F.2d 1030, 1035 (1 1th Cir. 1987); Harpole v. Arkansas Dep't of Human Servs.,
820 F.2d 923, 926-27 (8th Cir. 1987); Estate of Gilmore v. Buckley, 787 F.2d 714, 720-23 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986). For a discussion of what remains of the special relationship doc-
trine after DeShaney, see Smith, supra note 32, at 496-508.
54. 489 U.S. at 198-202.
55. 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990). See supra notes 3-8 and accompanying text.
56. 914 F.2d at 848-49. The court analogized to tort law. Although there is no duty to rescue,
a rescuer who saves a person from certain harm cannot then kill him. Id. at 849. Thus, in tile
context of foster care, when the state rescues a child from abusive parents, it may not knowingly
place the child in an equally dangerous situation.
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vented state officers from placing her in the care of a custodian whom the
state knew or had reason to know engaged in child abuse.57 The court
refused to distinguish foster care from institutionalization, reasoning
that, while differences exist between the two systems, "it can hardly be
thought-and it is not argued-that the Constitution requires a state to
adopt one system rather then the other.""8
Recently the Fifth Circuit found that when the Texas Department of
Health and Service removed children from their natural homes and
placed them under state supervision, the state had a duty to ensure ade-
quate foster care.59
Moreover, in LaShawn A. v. Dixon,60 the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia recently held that foster children have a liberty interest
in a reasonably safe placement, including safety from physical, psycho-
logical, and emotional harm.6 1 In that case, the plaintiff class of foster
children alleged constitutional and statutory violations in the D.C. De-
partment of Human Services (DHS) administration of the foster care sys-
tem.62 In finding that the DHS violated the children's statutory and
constitutional rights, the court analogized foster children to persons in-
voluntarily committed to state care, relying on Youngberg to hold that
foster children have a liberty interest in safe conditions while in state
custody.
63
57. Id. at 849.
58. Id. at 852.
59. Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1439 (5th Cir. 1990). The court based its holding on
the "special relationship" between the state and child that gave rise to the duty to protect, rather
than the legal custodial relationship. Id. The state's physical custody and supervision, as opposed to
legal custody, gave rise to affirmative protectional duties. Id. Thus, even after DeShaney, the "spe-
cial relationship" doctrine still has force; although the court limited it to custodial contexts. See
supra notes 36, 49 and accompanying text.
60. 762 F. Supp. 959 (D.D.C. 1991).
61. Id. at 991-994.
62. The plaintiff class consisted of children in foster care under the supervision of the District
of Columbia Department of Human Services (DHS) and children who, although not yet in care of
DHS, were known to the Department because of reported abuse or neglect. Id. at 960. The plain-
tiffs brought their federal statutory complaints under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare
Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-27, 670-79 (1988) and the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act, 42 U.S.C §§ 5101-06 (1988). Id. The plaintiffs also alleged that DHS deprived them of liberty
without due process of law. Id. at 99.
In determining the constitutional issue, the court acknowledged that courts generally should not
reach constitutional issues unnecessarily. However, in this case, because finding that the DHS vio-
lated statutory rights might leave the plaintiffs with no effective relief, the court felt compelled to
address the plaintiffs' constitutional complaints. 762 F. Supp. at 990-91.
63. 762 F. Supp. at 992-94.
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While no circuit has precluded the possibility that involuntarily placed
foster children have a constitutional right to safety, the right is not uni-
versally recognized. The Fourth Circuit in Milburn v. Anne Arundel
County Department of Social Services 4 read Youngberg narrowly, distin-
guishing between voluntary and involuntary foster children. The court
rejected the analogy between voluntary foster children and prison in-
mates or committed patients, holding that the former are not entitled to
the same Fourteenth Amendment right to safety.6"
F. Foster Children Have a Constitutional Right to Safety
Both from a constitutional standpoint and for policy reasons, courts
should grant foster children the same constitutional right to safety as
prison inmates or patients in a state institution.
The Youngberg Court stated that the right to personal security is an
"historic liberty interest," that substantive due process protects. 66 While
the state has no affirmative duty to provide the general public with a safe
environment, the state has an obligation to ensure the safety of those
whom it commits and renders dependent on it.67 The DeShaney Court
cited Youngberg and Estelle for the proposition that the affirmative re-
sponsibility for the safety of an individual arises when the state takes a
person into its custody.6" A state's use of its power to restrain an individ-
ual's liberty, rendering him unable to care for himself, creates a duty to
provide for his basic needs, including the right to reasonable safety.6 9
While DeShaney left open whether this reasoning applied equally to
foster children, commentators have expressed concerns that courts will
interpret the language narrowly and deny foster children the right to
safety. The argument asserts that since the foster child could not care for
himself before placement with the state, the state does not "restrain an
individual's freedom to act on his own behalf."70 However, the narrow
64. 871 F.2d 474 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 148 (1989).
65. Id. at 479. For a discussion of how the Fourth Circuit found that foster parents are not
state actors, see infra notes 144-52 and accompanying text. For criticisms of the Milburn decision,
see Oren, supra note 52, at 130-.47; Sinden, supra note 37, at 250-54.
66. 457 U.S. at 315 (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1977)).
67. Id. at 317-21.
68. 489 U.S. at 195-200.
69. Id.
70. Sinden, supra note 37, at 243-44. Sinden points out that Justice Brennan, dissenting in
DeShaney, recognized the implication of the majority's definition of special relationship when lie
argued that "restraining an individual's freedom to act on his own behalf" was not an element in the




reading of the DeShaney language is inconsistent with its application in
Youngberg to the institutionalized mentally retarded. The plaintiff in
Youngberg, possessed of the mental capacity of a eighteen-month-old
child, was unable to care for himself before the state committed him.
Nevertheless, the Court found that he had a right to safety. The denial of
the right to safety to foster children on this narrow reading of DeShaney
is thus irreconcilable with Youngberg.
The DeShaney reasoning logically applies to foster care, since the cus-
todial relationship Youngberg and Estelle relied on exists in the foster
care context as well. A child is placed in foster care in one of two ways:
either a court orders the placement or the parent voluntarily places the
child.7 In both situations, the state has legal and physical custody of the
child.72 Although the foster parent assumes physical custody once the
state places the child, the state or placement agency retains some degree
of day-to-day decisionmaking authority.73 Once the state assumes this
custodial responsibility, the foster child's situation becomes identical to
that of prison inmate or state mental patient.74
behalf before his commitment. This inability was not dispositive. Indeed, the Court still found a
right to safety. Justice Brennan reasoned that, accordingly, the majority's test is inconsistent with
Youngberg. 489 U.S. at 206 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71. In fact, approximately 33% of all foster children are voluntary placements. THEODORE J.
STEIN, CHILD WELFARE AND THE LAW 39 & n. 17,71 (1991); 1 ROGERS T. YoSHIKAMi & ARTHUR
C. EMLEN, A COMPARISON OF VOLUNTARY AND COURT ORDERED FOSTER CARE: DECISIONS,
SERVICES, AND PARENTAL CHOICE 3 (1983) (voluntary placements account for about one-third of
all placements). But see Judith Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the
State's Role in Child Neglect and Abuse Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887, 921-22 (1975) (voluntary place-
ments make up as much as 50% of all placements). See also Oren, supra note 37, at 117 n.22
(voluntary placements vary from state to state from at least 10%-77%, with the trend most likely
downward).
72. The natural parent, however, has visitation rights and power to make major medical deci-
sions. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (natural parent's fundamental interest in "care,
custody, and management of their child" exists despite loss of temporary custody to the state);
Sinden, supra note 37, at 248-49.
73. Sinden, supra note 37, at 249.
74. See Taylor v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 797 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065
(1989); Doe v. New York City Dep't of Social Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 142 (2d Cir. 1981) (recognizing
differences between institutionalization and foster care, but finding the same type of custody).
Professor Laura Oren suggests that "listening to the children's story" provides one ground for
according a safety right to foster children. See Oren, supra note 52, at 147-54. Oren cites a situation
in one federal district court case in which the court listened to the stories children told of their
experiences in mental hospitals, detention centers, group homes, and individual homes. These sto-
nes revealed an overworked, overloaded system that fails to provide essential services to the chil-
dren. Id. at 148. The stories "painted, in the words of the district court judge, 'a bleak and
Dickensian picture of life under the auspices of the DFCS.'" Id. (citing B.H. v. Johnson 715 F.
Supp. 1387, 1389 (N.D. Ill. 1989)).
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The Fourth Circuit's distinction between voluntary and involuntary
placement in Milburn is illusory for three reasons. First, placement in
foster care is rarely truly voluntary. Just as with parents of severely men-
tally retarded individuals, most parents who voluntarily place their chil-
dren in foster care do so because they are economically or emotionally
unable to raise a child and hence have no alternative to state care.75 Ad-
ditionally, the system encourages social workers to pressure unfit parents
to place their child with the state voluntarily. This avoids litigation and
forcible removal.76
Second, from the perspective of the child, foster care placement is no
more voluntary than it is for the severely retarded. Both are usually in-
capable of informed consent. Even those with consensual capacity rarely
act voluntarily under the circumstances. 7 Furthermore, Youngberg, by
emphasizing "involuntarily institutionalized" individuals, encouraged
the distinction between voluntary and involuntary placement. However,
the court deemed Nicholas Romeo involuntarily institutionalized,
although his mother petitioned for his commitment to the state hospi-
tal.78 Indeed, the Second Circuit explicitly expanded the Youngberg pro-
tection from those involuntarily committed to encompass all persons in
state custody.79
Third, as a policy matter, the state should not use the ill-defined volun-
tary/involuntary distinction to treat foster children with less regard than
others in state custody. At least one federal district court has recognized
that "[an] individual's liberty is not less worthy of protection merely be-
75. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 834
(1977) (suggesting that voluntary placements are not voluntary at all); Robert H. Mnookin, Foster
Care-In Whose Best Interests?, 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 599, 601 (1973); Oren, supra note 37, at 117
n.22; Mushlin, supra note 2, at 239-42; Mark Hardin, Setting Limits on Voluntary Foster Care, in
FoSTER CHILDREN IN THE COURTS 70, 70-71 (Mark Hardin ed., 1983).
76. See supra note 74.
77. Association for Retarded Citizens v. Olsen, 561 F. Supp. 473, 484 (D.N.D. 1982), aff'd in
part, 713 F.2d 1384 (8th Cir. 1983); Kolpak v. Bell, 619 F. Supp. 359, 377-79 (N.D. I11. 1985) ("for
all practical purposes, many of the residents of state-run mental institutions are effectively admitted
involuntarily").
78. Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 155 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc), vacated, 457 U.S. 307
(1982). See also Kolpak, 619 F. Supp. at 377 (plaintiff in Younberg involuntarily committed).
79. Society for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1245-46 (2d
Cir. 1984). In this case, residents of a state-operated school for the mentally retarded sought im-
proved living conditions. The court said that whether the residents are voluntarily or involuntarily
placed was irrelevant; in either case they are entitled to safe conditions. Id. The severely retarded




cause he has consented to be placed in a situation of confinement."" ° In
contrast, under the Fourth Circuit's holding a state repeatedly could
place a voluntary foster child with a known abusive foster parent with no
constitutional ramifications, whereas the state must protect an involun-
tary child from such a dangerous placement. Such a result produces two
deleterious effects. First, it encourages a state to treat involuntarily com-
mitted children with more care than those voluntarily placed. Second,
the voluntary foster child is entitled to less protection simply because her
parent decided to avoid litigation and forced removal. Thus the Fourth
Circuit discourages parents from voluntary placement. In an already
over-burdened court system,81 the state instead should seek to encourage
voluntary placement rather than court-ordered placements.
II. THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE AS APPLIED To FOSTER
PARENTS
The remainder of this Note assumes a foster child's Fourteenth
Amendment right to safety.8 2 If some party has breached that right, the
next question for section 1983 liability is whether the breaching party
acted under color of state law. 3 In most foster child abuse cases there
are two potentially liable parties: those who abuse the child (the foster
parents), and those who fail to protect her (the state officials overseeing
her case).
In K.H. Through Murphy v. Morgan, the Seventh Circuit assumed the
facts as the abused child alleged and found that the state agency officials
were state actors and that their failure to protect her was state action. 4
However, the court rejected the idea that foster parents are state actors.8 5
Based on the examination of the Supreme Court's development of the
state action doctrine and the role of foster parents in fulfilling the state's
80. Wilder v. City of New York, 568 F. Supp. 1132, 1137 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (quoting Association
for Retarded Citizens, 561 F. Supp. at 485).
81. See An Update: State Caseload Statistics, 7 STATE CT. J. SuMm. 8 n.3 (1983) (civil filings
have increased at an average rate of 5 3% each year; at this rate, filings would double every 13 1/2
years).
82. See supra notes 21-81 and accompanying text.
83. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
84. 914 F.2d 846, 852 (7th Cir. 1990). The court cited the articulation in Youngberg of the
state's duty of safety to children in its custody. The court also cited Doe for the corollary that the
state could not avoid that duty by substituting private for public custodians. Id. Thus the court
reasoned that the state officials were responsible for the actions of the private agency employees.
85. See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
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constitutional obligations to foster children, the Seventh Circuit's as-
sumption that foster parents are not state actors is questionable.
A. The Historical Development of the State Action Doctrine
The state action doctrine grew from the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the scope of Fourteenth Amendment protections. In the Civil
Rights Cases, 6 the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment prohib-
ited state, but not private, infringement of personal liberties. The Court
enunciated a strict framework for determining state action: only action
that a state takes directly constituted state action. 7 The Court expanded
the state action doctrine in the White Primary Cases,"8 holding that pri-
vate political organizations that ran white-only primary elections were
state actors.8 9 Thus, the Court moved away from the rigid "direct state
action" requirement, characterizing private conduct, indirectly related to
the state, as state action. Since then, the Court has struggled to develop a
clear theory for determining when private conduct is state action.
Prior to 1982, the Court developed at least four tests for determining
when private action constituted state action: the symbiotic relationship
86. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
87. Id. at 11. The Civil Rights Cases concerned a constitutional challenge to the Civil Rights
Act of 1875, which prohibited racial discrimination in public accommodations. The Court held the
Act void because the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited only direct action and that a prohibition on
private action would violate the concept of federalism. Id. at 11-15. See also Ronna Greff Schnei-
der, State Action-Making Sense Out Of Chaos-An HistoricalApproach, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 737, 743-
46 (1985); Hala Ayoub, Comment, The State Action Doctrine in State and Federal Courts, II FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 893, 894-95 (1984); Robert Hornstein, Note, Drawing New Boundaries Between State
Action and Section 1983"s Action Under Color of State Law Requirement: Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co., 36 ARK. L. REV. 609, 613 (1983).
88. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Nixon v.
Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
89. Herndon involved a challenge to a Texas statute provision that prohibited blacks from vot-
ing in a Democratic primary. The Court held the statute unconstitutional. 273 U.S. at 540. In
Condon, the plaintiff challenged the racially motivated decision of the Texas Democratic Party Exec-
utive Committee to refuse him the vote in a primary. The Court found that since the state conferred
its authority on the Committee, the party delegates who made the racially discriminatory decision
were state agents liable under the Fourteenth Amendment. 286 U.S. at 84-85, 89. In Allwright, the
Court found that the Democratic State Convention violated the Fifteenth Amendment by excluding
a black from the Democratic primary election. The private party's determination was state action
because the state delegated authority to the Democratic Party to determine qualifications for partici-
pation in the primary. 321 U.S. at 663. In Adams, the plurality found that a voluntary political
club's exclusion of blacks from voting in a primary election was state action. The club operated as
part of the Democratic Party, which was bound by the Fifteenth Amendment under Alhwright. 345
U.S. at 481-84. See generally Schneider, supra note 87, at 746-52.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss4/7
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test,9° the close nexus test,91 the joint participation test,92 and the public
function test.93 In 1982, the Court attempted to clarify and consolidate
these different theories in three state action cases.
The first of these cases, Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. ,9 involved a
creditor seeking prejudgment attachment of his debtor's property. The
county sheriff executed a writ of attachment pursuant to state statute. A
state trial judge subsequently dismissed the order because the creditor
failed to establish the statutory grounds for the attachment. The debtor
brought a section 1983 action alleging that the creditor acted under color
of state law." The Court reasoned that private conduct is state action if
90. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961). Private conduct is state action
when the "[s]tate has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with [the private
actor] that it may be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity." Id. at 725. The
Court found that leasing of space in a state-owned parking garage to a restaurant that discriminated
on the basis of race created a situation in which both parties mutually benefitted from the symbiotic
relationship. The restaurant enjoyed tax exempt status, and the discrimination benefitted the state
since serving blacks allegedly would injure business and hinder the restaurant's ability to pay rent.
Therefore, the restaurant, for constitutional purposes, was a state actor. Id. at 723-24. For a discus-
sion of Burton, see Thomas B. Lewis, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority-A Case Without
Precedent, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1458 (1961).
91. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). The Court focused on the
connection between government and the private entity's particular actions. The inquiry was
.'whether there [was] a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged action of the
regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself." Id. at
351. In Jackson, a privately owned and operated utility company terminated service to a customer
for payment delinquency. Id. at 347. The Court held that even though the utility was a heavily
regulated natural monopoly, it was not a state actor because no nexus existed between the state's
regulation and the challenged action. Id. at 358-59. In other words, the state's regulation did not
affect the utility's service termination. Id. Cf Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
92. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144
(1970). The joint participation test focuses on the degree to which government officials and private
parties act together. In Adickes, the Court found state action where a restaurant conspired with a
town policeman. The restaurant refused to serve the plaintiff who was with six black students, and
the policeman subsequently arrested the plaintiff for vagrancy. The policeman's involvement made
the restaurant's conduct state action. 398 U.S. at 150-52.
93. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). The public function test looks to whether the
private actor engages in conduct constituting a traditional and exclusive function of government. In
Marsh, police in a company-owned town arrested a Jehovah's Witness distributing leaflets for tres-
passing. The Court held that because the company built and operated the town primarily to benefit
the public, its conduct was state action. Accordingly, the company could not infringe the plaintiff's
First Amendment rights any more than could a traditional town government. Id. at 508-09. See
also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (state action when public officials are trustees of a ra-
cially discriminatory trust for a city park).
94. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
95. Id. at 924-25. The plaintiff brought the prejudgment attachment motion pursuant to VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-533 (Michie 1977) The statute required that, in order to obtain a prejudgment
attachment, creditors needed only to allege, in an ex parte petition, their belief that the debtor might
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it can be said to be "fairly attributable" to the state.96 The Court re-
quired that: 1) the exercise of a state-established right or privilege or
state-imposed rule must lead to the deprivation; and 2) the party respon-
sible for the deprivation must be an official or other person either acting
with an official or whose conduct is "otherwise chargeable to the state."97
In this case, a state statute authorized the prejudgment attachment pro-
cedure, satisfying the first prong. A state actor, the sheriff, executed the
writ and thereby satisfied the second prong.
In Blum v. Yaretsky, 98 a group of patients in a nursing home chal-
lenged the home's physicians' decision to transfer the patients to a lower
level of care pursuant to federal medicaid laws.99 The patients claimed
that since the physicians acted pursuant to state regulations, they were
state actors and must afford adequate process before denying the plain-
tiffs their entitlement."c° The Court, applying the nexus theory, held that
sell the property. The debtor's § 1983 action alleged that the creditor had acted jointly with the state
to deprive him of property without due process. 457 U.S. at 924-25.
In its analysis, the Court first noted that the state action requirement (for the Fourteenth Amend-
ment) and the "under color of law" requirement (for § 1983) are virtually identical. If the chal-
lenged conduct is state action then it is also "action under color of state law." Id. at 926-35. See
supra note 15.
96. 457 U.S. at 937.
97. Id. The Court noted that while the two principles are related, they are not the same. When
the complaint is directed against a state official, the two prongs collapse into each other. Id. (citing
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961)). If the claim is against a private party, the prongs
diverge. Id. For an interpretation of this part of the Court's opinion, see Ayoub, supra note 87, at
912-16.
98. 457 U.S. 991 (1982).
99. The plaintiffs alleged that the procedure did not afford them adequate process and they
sought regulations requiring a pre-transfer hearing. Under federal medicaid laws, in order for par-
ticipating states to receive money for distribution to needy elderly patients, the states must promul-
gate regulations requiring the nursing homes to evaluate the patients' needs. The homes establish a
review committee of independent physicians to assess the patients' necessary level of care. The phy-
sicians determine whether the patients require care in "skilled nursing facilities" or "health related
facilities." The latter provide less extensive and expensive care. For the patients to qualify for medi-
caid benefits, they must transfer to the unit according to the physicians' recommendation. Id. at
994-95.
100. Id. at 1003. The Court recognized that this case differed from more traditional state action
inquiries. Here the plaintiffs sought to require the state to adopt regulations to prohibit private
parties' actions; specifically, the plaintiffs argued that the nursing homes must provide a hearing
before recommending a transfer. This differs from cases in which the complaint seeks to hold a
private party liable for its conduct as state action, or cases in which the complaint challenges a state
actor's enforcement of state laws. Id. at 1003-12. Thus, because the state action doctrine primarily
deals with these latter two situations, the Blum case was an aberrational fact pattern for a state




the presence of state regulation did not convert private conduct into state
action; the regulations neither encouraged nor compelled the decision to
transfer, which was left to the physicians' professional judgement.1°0
The Court stated that the nexus between the state and private conduct is
satisfied when the state exercises coercive power or encourages the pri-
vate conduct 1 2 and when the private party exercises a public function. 10 3
The final case was Rendell-Baker v. Kohn." 4 The plaintiff brought a
section 1983 action against the school that had fired her. The state heav-
ily regulated the school and funded approximately ninety percent of its
programs. She asserted that her discharge violated her First, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendment rights."0 5 The Court cited Lugar for the "fairly
attributable" standard and examined each of the prior state action theo-
ries to determine if the school's conduct could be "fairly seen as state
action."" °  First, since the state's funding and regulation did not en-
courage or compel the discharge decision, neither alone met the nexus
test. Second, the school was not exercising a public function because
education is not an exclusive state function. Third, no symbiotic rela-
tionship existed between the state and the school; the discharge decision
did not benefit the state.
10 7
The three cases at first glance seem to further confuse the state action
doctrine, but they illuminate identifiable trends with predictive value.
First, the "fairly attributable" standard appears to be the Court's pri-
mary state action test when a complaint is brought under section 1983.10s
101. Id. at 1005-10. See supra note 99.
102. 457 U.S. at 1004 (citing, inter alia, Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 166 (1978)).
103. Id. at 1011. The nursing home did not exercise a public function. The Court stated that
decisions made in day-to-day administration are not traditionally and exclusively a state function.
Id.
104. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
105. Id. at 834. The school was a private institution for students with special needs who had
difficulty completing public high school. The school discharged the plaintiff for supporting a student
petition advocating greater responsibilities for the student-staff council in making hiring decisions.
She alleged that the school discharged her for exercising her First Amendment rights without ade-
quate due process. Id. at 831-35.
106. Id. at 838. The Court stated that "[t]he ultimate issue in determining whether a person is
subject to suit under § 1983 is the same question posed in cases arising under the Fourteenth
Amendment: is the alleged infringement of federal right 'fairly attributable to the State?'" Id. at
838 (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)).
107. Id. at 839-43.
108. See supra note 106. See also Barbara Rook Snyder, Private Motivation, State Action and
The Allocation of Responsibility For Fourteenth Amendment Violations, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1053
(1990) (as an alternative to the "'fairly attributable" standard, the state action inquiry should focus
on whether state action provided the impetus for private action; if so, state action exists if a court
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Second, the "fairly attributable" standard incorporates the prior state ac-
tion theories, their use dependent on the particular facts.10 9 Thus if a
plaintiff challenges a state actor's conduct a court uses the theories to
determine whether the state gave aid or granted a privilege to act to the
actor, satisfying the first prong of the "fairly attributed" test. If a statute
is challenged, on the other hand, the courts will use the different pre-
1982 theories to determine if the actor could be said to be a state actor,
satisfying the second prong. Finally, if a plaintiff challenges a private
actor's conduct, the courts use the theories to determine if both prongs of
the "fairly attributable" standard are satisfied. 10 Whether foster parents
are state actors and whether their abusive conduct constitutes state ac-
tion falls under this last scenario.
B. The State Action Doctrine in the Prison Context After West v.
Atkins
The Supreme Court has not addressed whether foster parents are state
actors, but the Court has decided a state action case involving private
parties in the prison context. In West v. Atkins,"'1 the Court faced the
questions of whether a prison physician was a state actor and whether his
failure to treat a prisoner adequately was state action.112
The plaintiff, a prison inmate, brought suit under section 1983 alleging
that the prison physician, acting under color of law, was deliberately in-
different to his injury, in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.11 3
would consider the action unconstitutional if a state actor had taken it); Ayoub, supra note 87, at
912-13.
109. For a further discussion of the interplay between the "fairly attributable" standard and the
different state action theories, see Ayoub, supra note 87, at 912-16. The author finds support for this
relationship in each of the three main cases. In each case the Court checked each test as a possible
way to attribute the private conduct to the state. Id.
110. See supra note 109.
111. 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
112. Prior to West, the majority of circuits had held that a state-employed physician was a state
actor. See, e.g., Oft v. Pinchback, 786 F.2d 1105 (1 1th Cir. 1986); Duncan v. Duckworth, 644 F.2d
653 (7th Cir. 1981); Byrd v. Wilson, 701 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1983).
For a comprehensive list of other citations, see West, 487 U.S. at 47 n.7. But see Calvert v. Sharp,
748 F.2d 861 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1132 (1985); Nash v. Wennar, 645 F. Supp. 238
(D. Vt. 1986) (doctor's deprivation of prisoner's rights did not have its source in state authority);
Smith v. Huffman, 670 F. Supp. 176 (W.D. Va. 1987) (registered nurse who was full-time employee
of the state prison was not a state actor).
113. 4$7 U.S. at 44-45. The inmate tore his Achilles tendon and alleged that a doctor, under
contract with the state to provide medical care to prisoners, was deliberately indifferent to his treat-
ment. The inmate stated that the doctor acknowledged that the injury required surgery, but that he
[Vol. 69:1201
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The Fourth Circuit, on rehearing, affirmed the district court's dismissal
of the complaint.' 14 The majority held that full-time, state-employed
doctors are not state actors when acting in their capacity as physi-
cians. 15 The court could find state action only if a physician exercised
authority outside of his professional judgment, such as in a custodial or
supervisory role. 16
The Supreme Court reversed, applying the Lugar "fairly attributable"
standard and finding state action."I7 The Court first addressed the lower
court's holding that a state-employed physician exercising professional
medical judgement is not a state actor. The Court noted that the law
considers a state employee acting in his official capacity a state actor., 8
The Court then rejected the idea that an employee's professional judg-
ment is not attributable to the state, arguing that state actors are not
"removed from the purview of section 1983 simply because they are pro-
fessionals acting in accordance with professional discretion and judge-
ment." 19 The state clothes a state-employed physician with authority of
state law by virtue of its relationship with the physician. The Court drew
the conclusion that this relationship makes the physician's action in
treating the inmates "fairly attributable to the state" and, consequently,
state action.
120
The Court then examined the facts in West: the physician was not a
refused to schedule it. The plaintiff argued that this denial of medical treatment constituted cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights. Id. at 45. See supra notes
21-25 and accompanying text.
114. West v. Atkins, 815 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1987) (en bane), rev'd, 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
115. Id. at 995.
116. Id. The court relied on Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981), which held that a
public defender is not a state actor when performing traditional functions as counsel to a defendant.
While the Fourth Circuit did not rely on the Court's rationale in Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 91
(1982), the two rationales are related. In Blum, the Supreme Court held that the state did not
mandate the decisions of physicians to transfer nursing home patients. Rather, the decisions resulted
from the doctors' professional judgment. Similar to the position taken by the West Court, the Blum
Court held that it could not attribute this professional judgment to the state. See supra notes 98-103
and accompanying text.
117. 487 U.S. at 54. The Court followed the two-prong Lugar format. Id. at 54-57. See infra
notes 118-21.
118. 487 U.S. at 51-52. This seems to satisfy the second Lugar requirement of finding a state
actor. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
119. 487 U.S. at 52.
120. Id. at 54-55. This portion of the circuit court's analysis seemed to go to the first prong of
the Lugar test. The relationship between the physician and state is such that the state confers on the
physician the right and obligation to treat the inmates, deferring to the physician's discretion. See
supra note 97 and accompanying text.
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state employee, but rather had a contractual arrangement with the state.
The Court found this distinction insignificant. In both state-employment
and contractual arrangements, the state authorizes physicians to provide
medical care for prison inmates. The Court stated that in either case the
state delegates to the physician its constitutional duty to provide care to
the inmates. In addition, the consequences for the prisoner are the same;
he has no one else to turn to for medical care.121 The Court reasoned
that the special relationship between state and physician, and the in-
mate's dependance on both, is a nexus sufficient to constitute state action.
The Court found the employment distinction irrelevant, arguing that
"the physician's function within the system, not the precise terms of his
employment... determines whether his actions can be fairly attributed
to the state."' 122  Since the physician's function of fulfilling the state's
constitutional obligation to the prisoners made his conduct state action,
the Court found the physician liable under section 1983.123
C. The Seventh and Fourth Circuits' Determinations That Foster
Parents Are Not State Actors
Currently, two circuits hold that foster parents are not state actors:
the Seventh Circuit in K.H. Through Murphy v. Morgan, 24 and the
Fourth Circuit in Milburn v. Anne Arundel County Department of Social
Services. 12 5
The K.H. court reasoned from DeShaney v. Winnebago County De-
partment of Social Services 126 that foster parents are not state actors. 27
DeShaney held that the state did not have a Fourteenth-Amendment ob-
ligation to remove a child from his father's custody, even when the state
knew that the father was abusing the child.' The Seventh Circuit in
K.H. explained that if state placement made foster parents state actors,
then if the state turned over custody to natural parents, logic would com-
121. The Court noted that the prisoner was in "close custody" which, under state law, prohib-
ited him from going outside the prison to obtain medical care. 487 U.S. at 44, 55 & n.2. The state
caused the deprivation by denying him the ability to seek other medical care combined with the
physician's deliberate indifference to the prisoner's medical needs. Id. at 55.
122. Id. at 55-56.
123. Id. at 56-57.
124. 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1990).
125. 871 F.2d 474 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 148 (1989).
126. 489 U.S. 189 (1989). See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
127. 914 F.2d at 852.
128. 489 U.S. at 202.
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pel courts to hold natural parents to be state actors. According to the
court, this would "undo Deshaney.' 29
The Fourth Circuit in Milburn similarly found that foster parents are
not state actors and thus are not liable under section 1983.130 The court
cited Lugar 131 for the "fairly attributable" test, but focused mainly on
the state action analysis derived from Blum v. Yaretsky. 32 The court
noted first that for state action to exist, there must be a sufficiently close
nexus between the challenged conduct and the state such that the state
may be held responsible for the conduct. Second, a state is not responsi-
ble for the specific conduct unless it has coerced or encouraged the ac-
tion. Third, the nexus may exist if the private party exercises an
exclusive state function. 133 In this case, the conduct complained of was
the foster parent's child abuse. The court held that, although the foster
parents had a contract with the county and the state regulated the foster
home, the contract and regulations did not encourage the child abuse. 34
In addition, the court stated that care of foster children is not an exclu-
sive state function. Accordingly, the court held that the foster parents
were not state actors.
13 5
D. Foster Parents Are State Actors
The West rationale, finding that the prison physician was a state actor,
is equally persuasive when applied to foster parents who abuse foster
children. Courts generally do not consider foster parents or the physi-
cian in West state employees. Rather, the law views them as contract
service providers. 136 Foster children, like the prisoners in West who had
129. 914 F.2d at 852.
We emphasize that the issue is not whether the state's duty follows the child into the
private home in which he is placed. We may assume, without having to decide, that it does
not, that foster parents. .. are not state agents.... Certainly if the state decides to return
a child whom it has taken custody of to the child's natural parents, those parents do not
become state agents.
Id,
130. 871 F.2d at 479.
131. Lugar v. Edmundson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982). See supra notes 94-97 and accompany-
ing text.
132. 457 U.S. 830 (1982). See supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text.
133. 871 F.2d at 477-78.
134. Id. at 479.
135. Id.
136. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 826 (1977)
("Foster parents who are licensed by the State or an authorized foster care agency.., provide care
under a contractual arrangement with the agency, and are compensated for their services"). In New
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no choice in their medical care, have no choice in their parental care.
The state removes them from their natural parents and decides who will
have physical custody of the children. They are completely dependant
on the state. 137 In addition, one could argue that foster children are even
more deserving of constitutional protections since, unlike criminals, the
state exercises custodial power over them through no fault of their own.
Moreover, like the state regulation of physicians in West, states regulate
who may and may not be foster parents through license procedures and
qualification requirements.1 38 Just as only state-authorized doctors treat
inmates, the state may place foster children solely with state-authorized
York, for instance, the courts have uniformly treated foster parents as contract service providers.
See New York em rel. Ninesling v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Servs., 386 N.E.2d 235 (N.Y.
1978) (foster parents enter into a contractual arrangement to provide care for children with the
express understanding that the placement is temporary); Minella v. Amhrein, 516 N.Y.S.2d 494
(App. Div. 1987) (foster parents are essentially contract service providers); Harris v. State, 502
N.Y.S.2d 760 (App. Div. 1986) (custodians of state-certified family-care home for mentally disabled
individual are like foster parents and are contract service providers, not employees of the state);
Blanca C. v. County of Nassau, 480 N.Y.S.2d 747 (App. Div. 1984) (foster parents are not county
employees, but state contract providers), aff'd, 481 N.E.2d 545 (N.Y. 1985). See also Bartels v.
County of Westchester, 429 N.Y.S.2d 906 (App. Div. 1980); In re Mavis M., 441 N.Y.S.2d 950
(Fam. Ct. 1981). See generally Sanford N. Katz, Legal Aspects of Foster Care, 5 FAM. L.Q. 283
(1971) (foster parents most commonly are not considered employees, their rights and duties are
determined by contract); Mnookin, supra note 75, at 610.
The distinction in the above cases turns on state law. In Illinois, state laws give the Department of
Children and Family Services ("Department") authority to contract with agencies or parents for
care of a child in its custody. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, para. 5005 (1988 & Supp. 1990). The assorted
foster parents in KH. either had a contract with the Department, or with the Central Baptist Family
Services, a state-authorized agency. K.H. Through Murphy v. Morgan, No. 87C 9833, 1989 WL
105279, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 6, 1989), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 914 F.2d 846 (7th Cir.
1990). Therefore, although Illinois courts never explicitly addressed the question, it seems that Illi-
nois treats foster parents not as state employees, but as contract service providers.
137. In placing a child, Illinois law mandates that the court consider the minor's preferences.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, para. 802-27 (1990). In addition, the minor may apply to the court for a
change of custody or appointment of a new custodian. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, para. 802.28(3)
(1990). However, the court is the final decisionmaker and the child must comply. Moreover, almost
33% of foster children in Illinois are five years old or younger, and do not possess the capacity to
indicate a preference or apply for a change in custody. See ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES, HUMAN SERVICES DATA REPORT PHASE 1: FISCAL YEARS 1986-1988, at
71 (1988) (29% of the total foster children in Illinois were less than five years old; 32% between ages
6-12; 33% between 13-17).
138. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 826
(1977). Illinois law requires that the Department of Children and Family Services promulgate poli-
cies and standards for licensing. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2213 (1990). All applicants must
submit to a criminal background investigation and applicants who have been convicted of various
sex crimes or kidnapping are not eligible for a license. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, para. 2214.2 (1990).
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agencies or families.139
Furthermore, the relationship between foster parents and the state is
analogous to the relationship between prison physicians and the state.
States owe a constitutional duty of safety to those taken into custody,
including foster children.'I The state delegates this duty to either foster
families or private agencies 41 who, in turn, delegate to foster parents.
139. In West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988), the state actor question (the Lugar second prong)
turned on the combination of state authorization of the physicians and the inmates' inability to
choose who treats them. Id. at 54-57. Similarly, courts should consider foster parents state actors
because the child is dependent on the state for care, and the state authorizes foster parents to provide
the care. This combination satisfies Lugar's second prong for foster parents just as it did for prison
physicians in West. See supra notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 21-81 and accompanying text.
141. Generally, courts hold that private foster placement agencies are state actors. See Wilder v.
Bernstein, 848 F.2d 1338, 1341 (2d Cir. 1988) (child-care agencies fulfill what would otherwise be a
state function); Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1979) (private foster care agency's
conduct is state action); Campbell v. Philadelphia, No. 88-6976, 1990 WL 102945, at * 3 (E.D. Pa.
July 18, 1990) (private foster care agency under contract with the state is a state actor); Zemola v.
Johnson, No. 89C 0798, 1989 WL 111868, at *4 (N.D. Il1. July 24, 1989) (a private placement
agency that contracts with the Department of Children and Family Services acts as an agent of the
Department and thus is a state actor); McAdams v. Salem Children's Home, 701 F. Supp. 630 (N.D.
I11. 1988) (an individual contracting with the state to provide for a child in state custody is suffi-
ciently connected to the state to be a state actor); Arneth v. Gross, 699 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y.
1988) (to the extent that a Catholic mission is financed with state or city funds, the mission is
engaged in state action under the Fourteenth Amendment); Brooks v. Richardson, 478 F. Supp. 793
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (authorized agency empowered to care for and take custody of state wards acts
under color of state law).
Courts also have held agencies for the mentally impaired liable as state actors. See Fialkowski v.
Greenwich Home For Children, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. Pa. 1987) (when a state chooses to
delegate its constitutional duties to a private entity, the entity acts under color of state law); Daven-
port v. Saint Mary Hosp., 633 F. Supp. 1228, 1234 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Lombard v. Eunice Kennedy
Shriver Center for Mental Retardation, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 677, 680 (D. Mass. 1983).
In other contexts as well, courts have found state action when the state delegates its duties to a
private party. In Thomas S. v. Morrow, 781 F.2d 367 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1124 (1986),
the court held that a court-ordered guardian of an incompetent young adult was a state actor. But
see Taylor v. First Wyoming Bank, 707 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1983). In Horton v. Flenory, 889 F.2d
454 (3rd Cir. 1989), the court held that a private club owner was a state actor. The police had a
policy of deferring the investigation of thefts occurring in private clubs to the clubs themselves. The
police in this case left a theft suspect who was also an employee of the club with the club's owner for
interrogation. The club owner subsequently beat the employee to death. The court held that the
police clothed the owner with the authority of state law, and therefore he was a state actor. See also
Milo v. Cushing Memorial Hosp., 861 F.2d 1194 (10th Cir. 1988) (privately run public hospital is
public entity and its conduct is state action).
One exception to these general principles is Malachowski v. City of Keene, 787 F.2d 704 (Ist Cir.),
cerL denied, 479 U.S. 828 (1986). There the court held that a private, non-profit organization that
made foster homes available for state agencies and made recommendations for placement was not a
state actor. The state did not regulate, or have a contract with, the organization. In addition, the
court found the plaintiff's allegation of state action "bald and conclusory." Id. at 710-11. This case
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Foster parents' nonemployment relationship with the state is not deter-
minative. The foster parents' function in carrying out the state's consti-
tutional obligations makes their actions "fairly attributable" to the
state. 142
The Seventh Circuit's dicta in KH. Through Murphy v. Morgan, sug-
gesting that foster parents are not state actors, is in error for two reasons.
First, the court's reliance on DeShaney is misplaced. In DeShaney, the
state ceded both legal and physical custody of the child to his father. 143
The Court's holding turned on the lack of a custodial relationship be-
tween the state and the child, not on whether the abusing party was the
parent. In the foster care context, the state always retains legal custody;
when it places a child it cedes only physical custody." Thus, finding a
is distinguishable on its facts and faulty pleading; almost all states regulate and contract with the
foster care agencies.
Another case distinguishable on its facts is Fike v. United Methodist Childrens' Home, 547 F.
Supp. 286 (E.D. Va. 1982), aff'd, 709 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 1983). There the court held that a home for
state wards did not engage in state action when it fired an employee. The court did not consider
whether the home was a state actor for services related to the wards.
Privatization of prisons is another area in which courts have not yet developed the state action
doctrine. However, some legal scholars argue that the role of private correction facilities satisfies the
Lugar "fairly attributable" test, the nexus test, and the public function test. Moreover, in certain
situations, the facility's employees should be considered state actors as well. See Charles W. Thomas
& Linda S. Calvert Hanson, The Implications of 42 US.C. § 1983for the Privatization of Prisons, 16
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 933, 941-46 (1989); Douglas W. Dunham, Note, Inmates' Rights and the
Privatization of Prisons, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1475, 1478-81 (1986) (since prison operation and man-
agement is an exclusive state function and private operation of prisons also satisfies the nexus test,
private prisons should be considered state actors).
142. This nexus between the state and foster parent clothes the foster parent with authority of
state law, fulfilling Lugar's first prong. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
Another state action theory that might apply in this context is the public function doctrine. In
West the Court acknowledged that while medical care is not traditionally an exclusive state service,
the Court, under the public function analysis, should examine the context of the performance, 487
U.S. at 56 n.15. In West, the doctor provided medical care in the correctional setting, which is an
exclusive state function. Similarly, parenting, like medical care, is not a traditionally exclusive state
service. Seen in the context of assuming legal custody of a child, however, providing parental and
custodial care is a traditional state function. This public function analysis also would satisfy the first
Lugar prong.
At least one writer has stated that West relied on a public function theory without explicitly so
stating, because the Court disfavors that theory. Elizabeth Alexander, West v. Atkins: Prison Doc-
tors Remain State Actors, in CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION AND ArORNEY FEES ANNUAL HAND-
BOOK 139 (Barbara H. Wolvovitz ed., 1989). This argument has some merit particularly since the
Fourth Circuit's dissent relied expressly on a public function theory.
143. 489 U.S. at 191.
144. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 827 n.18
(1977) (foster parent does not have full authority of a legal custodian); Vonner v. State, 273 So. 2d
252 (La. 1973) (when Department of Public Welfare places a child with foster parents, the Depart-
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foster parent a state actor, even in a placement with natural parents, is
consistent with DeShaney. The state would still have legal custody of the
child, and thus would be responsible to act if it knew of the child
abuse.'45
Second, the court wrongly assumed that a child's natural parent could
be considered a foster parent. Placing a child with a natural parent does
not transform that parent into a foster parent. The natural parent has
much greater decisionmaking power and more legal rights with regard to
the child in its custody than does a foster parent. 46 Moreover, as a mat-
ter of policy, natural parents should not be considered foster parents. A
fundamental tenet of federal and state foster care policy mandates re-
moval from a natural parent only if absolutely necessary; but if removal
is necessary, the state is to use reasonable efforts to reunite the child with
his or her natural parents.147 In contrast, custody with foster parents is
ment, not the foster parents, has legal custody). See Mark Hardin, Legal Placement Options to
Achieve Permanence for Children in Foster Care, in FOSTER CHILDREN IN THE COURTS 128, 140
(Mark Hardin ed., 1983) (when a child is placed in foster care, the child welfare agency obtains
custody- thus the agency, not the foster parent, has the power and duty to make decisions for the
child); supra note 71 and accompanying text.
145. The Seventh Circuit in K.H. interprets DeShaney to stand for the proposition that the state
does not have an affirmative obligation to remove a child from his father when the state knows of
abuse. 914 F.2d at 848-49. This interpretation is flawed, however, because the Court based its
decision on the child's custodial status, not on the identity of the abuser. The state did not have
custody of the child, therefore it had no obligation to help the child. In the foster care context,
where the agency has legal custody of the child, it has an affirmative duty not to place the child with
known abusive parents, whether they are his natural parents or not. The reasoning in K.H. is incon-
sistent with DeShaney because of the existence of a custodial relationship between the child and the
state in the foster child context. See Oren, supra note 52, at 143-47.
146. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
147. Congress passed the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-28,
670-79 (1988) as a comprehensive reform of the national child welfare system. Congress had two
objectives: to prevent children's removal from their own homes, and to facilitate the child's place-
ment in a permanent foster home or return to his or her natural parents. 42 U.S.C. § 625 (1988).
For instance, the Act states that for a state to qualify for federal funds, "in each case reasonable
efforts will be made (A) prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the
need for removal of the child from his home and (B) to make it possible for the child to return to his
home .. " 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15) (1988).
Illinois echoes this policy, defining child welfare services as "... public social services directed
toward the accomplishment of the following purposes:... (3) preventing the unnecessary separation
of children from their families . . (4) restoring to their families, children who have been re-
moved...."
See generally STEIN, supra note 71, at 36-39; Mary Lee Allen et al., A Guide to the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, in FOSTER CHILDREN IN THE COURTS 575-609 (Mark
Hardin ed., 1983).
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intentionally only temporary. 48 This policy rests on the state's interest
in the special relationship between parent and child. Thus, finding that
foster parents are state actors is consistent with DeShaney if courts rec-
ognize the factual and legal differences between placement with natural
and foster parents.
The Milburn analysis, determining that foster parents are not state ac-
tors, is flawed because it fails to consider West v. Atkins. 149 The Milburn
court's holding cannot be reconciled with West for several reasons.
First, the Fourth Circuit failed to recognize the similarity between foster
children and incarcerated persons. Consequently, the court ignored an
important part of the West analysis: the special relationship between the
state and the physician based on the inmate's dependence on the state for
medical care.150 Accordingly, the court did not consider the foster
child's dependence on the state for care and safety and the special rela-
tionship this creates between the state and the foster parents.
Second, the court did not make the analogy between a physician fulfil-
ling the state's constitutional duty to provide prisoners with medical care
and the foster parent fulfilling the state's constitutional duty to provide
safety and care for foster children.15 Instead, the court looked only at
the contractual and regulatory relationship between the foster parents
and the state, overlooking their unique functional relationship.
Third, the court's public function argument is inconsistent with West.
West emphasized that a public function analysis must consider the con-
text of the case.'52 However, the Milburn court looked only at care of
foster children generally, not considering the case in which the state re-
tains legal custody of the child. In this context, the state still bears the
responsibility for the child's care and safety. The state merely delegates
this responsibility to the foster parents. In the fulfillment of this obliga-
tion, the foster parents perform an exclusive state function.
CONCLUSION
Courts currently recognize a constitutional right to safety and ade-
148. See supra note I and accompanying text.
149. 487 U.S. 42 (1988). See supra notes 112-29. This omission is particularly curious because
West originated in the Fourth Circuit. West v. Atkins, 815 F.2d 993 (4th Cir. 1987). For a critical
analysis of Milburn, see Oren, supra note 52; Sinden, supra note 37, at 248-58.
150. 487 U.S. at 55. See supra notes 114-23.
151. See supra notes 21-81 and accompanying text.
152. 487 U.S. at 56 n.15. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
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quate care for prisoners and the mentally impaired in state custody.153
While authority exists for a right to safety for foster children, there is no
general consensus.- 4 As a matter of legal principle and policy, this right
should extend to foster children. Courts distinguish prisoners and the
institutionalized mentally impaired from all others because of their cus-
todial status. 55 However, the same conditions apply to foster children.
In addition, the state removes foster children from their parents, possibly
placing them in a more dangerous position.156 As a matter of policy, the
law should hold the states accountable for the child's safety and care.
Since states should have a duty to provide safe conditions for foster
children, the law should hold foster parents liable as state actors. 5 7 Be-
cause of the unique relationship among the state, foster children, and
foster parents, courts must consider foster parents state actors. When
the state delegates its constitutional duty of care and safety to foster par-
ents, the parents' conduct in that context is "fairly attributable" to the
state.' 58 As a consequence of finding a constitutional duty of care and
safety, and correspondingly of finding that foster parents are state actors,
substitute care systems will provide a safer haven for all foster children.
Terrence J. Dee
153. See supra notes 21-34 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 37-45, 53-81 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 21-36 and accompanying text.
156. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 82-152 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text.
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